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In this paper we provide an analytical account of the mechanisms through which 
globalization, in the sense of increased foreign trade and long-term capital flows, affects 
the lives of the rural poor in developing countries (in their capacity as workers, 
consumers, recipients of public services or users of common property resources). 
Globalization can cause many hardships for the rural poor, but it also opens up some 
opportunities which some countries can utilize and others do not, largely depending on 
their domestic political and economic institutions, and the net outcome is often quite 
complex and almost always context-dependent, belying the glib pronouncements for or 
against globalization made in the opposing camps.  
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As is common in most contentious public debates, different people mean different 
things by globalization. Some interpret it to mean the global reach of new technology 
and capital movements, some refer to outsourcing by domestic companies in rich 
countries, others protest against the tentacles of corporate capitalism or US hegemony 
(economic, military or cultural). In this paper I shall limit myself to interpreting 
globalization simply as openness to foreign trade and long-term capital flows. I shall 
ignore here the important issues arising from the devastation caused to fragile 
economies by billions of dollars of volatile short-term capital stampeding around the 
globe in herd-like movements, or the substantial poverty-reducing potential of 
international (unskilled) labour flows from poor to rich countries (even if allowed in 
temporary and regulated doses). 
By poverty I shall refer to absolute poverty in low-income countries. A large part of 
the discussion around globalization is around its effect on relative inequality, which 
we will largely ignore in this paper. In many of these countries most of the poor are in 
the rural sector, which will be our main focus. While what happens to the urban 
manufacturing and services sectors as a result of globalization has attracted a lot of 
attention, and can have a large impact on the work opportunities of migrants from the 
rural sector and thus their poverty, I shall largely confine myself to the rural sector 
(both agricultural and non-agricultural). For example, the role globalization may have 
played in weakening trade unions and thus the bargaining power of organized 
industrial workers in achieving improvements in their living standards is an important 
topic, but since such trade unions are rare in the rural sector of poor countries, we 
shall not discuss this topic here.  
In this paper I mainly provide a brief analytical account of the various processes 
through which globalization in our sense of the term affects the lives of the rural poor. 
In general I believe that globalization can cause many hardships for the poor in these 
countries, but it also opens up opportunities which some countries utilize and others 
do not, largely depending on their domestic political and economic institutions and 
policies, and the net outcome is often quite complex and almost always context-
dependent, belying the glib pronouncements for or against globalization made in the 
opposing camps.  
There have been attempts to positively relate trade liberalization with economic 
growth, and relate growth with poverty reduction on the basis of cross-country 
regressions. The former relation has been found controversial,1 while the latter is 
more sturdy. In any case there are deep methodological-econometric flaws in such 
cross-country regressions, apart from acute problems of reliability and comparability 
of the data for many countries. The results of a more micro analysis of the impact of 
trade liberalization on total factor productivity growth at the enterprise level are 
mixed (and scanty for the rural sector). Even for the relationship between openness 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Rodrik and Rodríguez (2000). Warner (2003) has in turn refuted some of the 
criticisms of the earlier literature made by the latter. Wacziarg and Welch (2003) shift the focus 
from cross-section to time-series and panel analysis and seem to support the view that trade 
liberalization has a positive impact on growth.   
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and levels of firm productivity, the evidence is quite ambiguous, as can be seen in the 
survey by Tybout (2000). While the long-run effect of growth on poverty reduction is 
generally accepted, the usefulness of the average estimated value of the elasticity of 
this effect—taken to be 2 in an estimate reported in the World Development Report 
2001, i.e., a 1 per cent increase in real per capita income has been associated with a 
reduction in the headcount incidence of poverty by 2 per cent—is somewhat limited, 
as the underlying causal model is underspecified. Also, the value of the elasticity 
varies from country to country depending on initial conditions (particularly initial 
levels of income and the extent of social and economic inequality), and, of course, 
varies a great deal, even within (large) countries.  
Most of the general statements one sees in popular presentations on the impact of 
globalization on poverty are essentially those of correlation. Pro-globalizers point to 
the large decline in poverty in China, India and Indonesia (countries long 
characterized by massive rural poverty) in the recent decades of international 
economic integration. Chen and Ravallion have estimated that between 1981 and 
2001 the percentage of rural people living below an international poverty line of 
US$1.08 per day (at 1993 purchasing power parity) declined from about 79 per cent2 
to about 27 per cent in China, from about 63 per cent to about 42 per cent in India, 
and 55 per cent to 11 per cent in Indonesia. But, contrary to repeated assertions in the 
international financial press, no one has yet convincingly demonstrated that this 
decline is mainly due to globalization. In China it could instead be, to a large extent, 
due to internal factors like expansion of infrastructure or the massive 1978 land 
reforms or policy changes relating to grain procurement prices or the relaxation of 
restrictions on rural-to-urban migration. That the spurt in agricultural growth 
following the 1978 decollectivization and land reform may be largely responsible for 
poverty reduction in China is suggested by the fact that the substantial part of the 
decline in poverty in the last two decades already happened by mid-1980s, before the 
big strides in foreign trade or investment.3 Similarly, rural poverty reduction in India 
may be attributable to the spread of Green Revolution in agriculture, large anti-
poverty programmes or social movements in India, and not the trade liberalization of 
the 1990s (which, in any case, was largely confined to the non-agricultural sectors). In 
Indonesia4 sensible macroeconomic policies—an active rice price stabilization policy, 
massive investment in rural infrastructure—and the green revolution played a 
substantial role in the large reduction of rural poverty between 1981 and 2001 (note 
that by early 1980s the oil boom was largely over and by 2001 the economy has not 
fully recovered from the financial crisis).  
Those who are more dubious of global processes point out that in the same decades, 
poverty has remained stubbornly high in Sub-Saharan Africa; as Chen and Ravallion 
                                                 
2  This figure actually relates to China in 1980. 
3  Ravallion and Chen (2004) note that mean tariff rates in China fell only slightly in the 1980s and 
non-tariff barriers actually increased, and show econometrically that growth in the primary sector 
(mainly agriculture) rather than in the secondary or tertiary sectors is largely responsible for the 
decline in poverty. One of their conclusions: ‘our data do not suggest that expanding trade can 
explain China’s progress against poverty’. 
4  See, for example, Timmer (2004).  
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(2004) have estimated, between 1981 and 2001 the percentage of people5 living 
below the poverty line of US$1.08 per day (at 1993 purchasing power parity) 
increased in Sub-Saharan Africa from about 42 per cent to about 46 per cent. But this 
may have little to do with globalization, and more to do with unstable or failed 
political regimes, wars and civil conflicts which afflicted several countries in Africa; 
if anything, such instability only reduced their extent of globalization, as it scared off 
many foreign investors and traders. 
Section 2 
If one goes beyond correlations, the causal processes through which international 
economic integration can affect poverty primarily involve the poor in their capacity as 
workers, as consumers, and as recipients of public services or users of common 
property resources.  
Let us first take the case of poor workers in the rural sector. They are mainly either 
self-employed or wage earners. The self-employed work on their own tiny farms or as 
artisans and petty entrepreneurs in small shops and household enterprises. The major 
constraints they usually face are in credit, marketing and insurance, and infrastructure 
(like roads, power, extension service and irrigation), and government regulations 
(involving venal inspectors, insecure land rights, etc.). These often require substantive 
domestic policy and governance changes; foreign traders and investors are not 
directly to blame. If these changes are not made and the self-employed poor remain 
constrained, then, of course, it is difficult for them to withstand competition from 
large agri-business or firms (foreign or domestic). Let us just cite two examples. 
Using panel data for farm households in Zambia, Deininger and Olinto (2000) show 
that many households could not reap productivity benefits from external liberalization 
because they lacked key assets like draft animals and farm implements. Similarly 
Lopez, Nash, and Stanton (1995) show from panel data of farm households in Mexico 
that the supply response to price incentives is much lower for households with more 
limited access to capital. Opening the product markets internationally without doing 
anything about the weak or distorted factor markets like credit or infrastructural 
services may thus be a sub-optimal policy for many poor farmers and artisans, both 
from the point of view of their exploiting new opportunities and of social protection 
for those who may need extra help to cope. 
Measurement of the direct impact of trade reform on poverty is actually quite tricky. 
Apart from the scarcity of detailed household data before and after trade reform, it is 
often difficult to disentangle the effects of trade reform from those of other reforms 
and other events and shocks that affect the household poverty dynamics. Most 
existing attempts to measure are really with simulation models. Litchfield, McCulloch 
and Winters (2003) is among the first empirical attempts, using household survey data 
for more than one period in time. For Vietnam in the 1990s, for example, they find in 
a multinomial logit model that the trade variables have a positive significant effect on 
a household’s chance of escaping poverty. 
                                                 
5  This relates to the total population; they do not yet have a separate estimate for rural poverty.   
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It is not hard to see that openness to foreign trade and investment may sometimes help 
in relieving some of the bottlenecks in infrastructure and services and in essential 
parts, components and other intermediate products like fertilizers and pesticides. 
Gisselquist and Grether (2000), for example, show how farmers in Bangladesh 
benefited as liberalization increased the availability of farm inputs. In a more general 
sense international diffusion of technology in agriculture, of which the Green 
Revolution has been a dramatic example, has led to large reductions in poverty, 
particularly in Asia, even though the larger dependence of farm households on 
purchased inputs that became necessary increased the importance of the constraints of 
credit and irrigation. 
Small farms or firms that are not severely handicapped by the credit and other 
constraints are sometimes more productive than their larger counterparts, and are also 
sometimes more successful in export markets. Small producers are often heavily 
involved in exports (for example, coffee producers of Uganda, rice growers in 
Vietnam, shrimp farmers in coastal Bangladesh or India, garment producers in 
Bangladesh or Cambodia). But in exports the major hurdle they face is often due to 
not more globalization but less. Developed country protectionism and subsidization of 
farm and food products and simple manufactures (like textiles and clothing) severely 
restrict their export prospects for poor countries.6 By estimates of the World Bank, 
based on the widely used GATP (Global Trade Analysis Project) model, the total 
income losses incurred by developing countries on account of rich-country trade 
barriers on textiles and apparel amount to about US$24 billion. Taking tariffs and 
tariff-equivalent of subsidies in agriculture, Cline (2004) estimates that the overall 
protection in agriculture is about 20 per cent for US, 46 per cent7 for EU, 52 per cent 
for Canada, and 82 per cent for Japan. The annual loss to developing countries from 
agricultural tariffs and subsidies in rich countries is estimated from a static CGE 
model and the GATP trade and protection database by Cline (2004) to be about 
US$45 billion (and much higher if dynamic effects are taken into account). 
I wish the anti-global protesters of rich countries turned their energies toward the 
vested interests in their own countries which prolong this protectionism and cripple 
the efforts of the poor of the world to climb out of their poverty. Pro-poor opponents 
of NAFTA, for example, point out how competition from northern agri-business is 
destroying the livelihoods of small farmers in Mexico, without being equally vocal 
about the farm subsidies and tariffs in the US and Canada (now going to be even 
substantially larger under the new US farm policy) which are, to a large extent, 
responsible for this. US wheat export prices are estimated to be 46 per cent below cost 
                                                 
6  This is, of course, not to minimize the trade barriers imposed by developing countries on imports of 
other developing countries, which are often higher than those imposed by rich countries. There are 
some conflicting estimates of the welfare gains of the reduction in trade barriers imposed by 
developing countries themselves in relation to that for reduction in trade barriers imposed by 
industrial countries. A convincing estimate by Cline (2004) suggests that industrial-country 
liberalization provides from about half to two-thirds of the total potential welfare gains to 
developing countries from trade liberalization all around. 
7  Adjusting for preferential entry of farm products from some countries, the agricultural protection 
for EU goes down to 34.5 per cent.  
5 
of production, US corn export prices are at 20 per cent below cost, and so on.8 It is 
not surprising that US subsidies in cotton provided a major flashpoint in the 
breakdown of the WTO’s ministerial negotiations in Cancún in September 2003, as 
this crop is grown by farmers in some of the poorest countries of the world. Of course, 
this is not to minimize the responsibility of domestic governments. In Mexico, for 
example, following the peso crisis of 1994 the government abandoned its plans to 
phase in the trade liberalization gradually, and also largely withdrew from providing 
the necessary public support infrastructure for poor farmers. 
Another increasingly important barrier to trade many small farmers of developing 
countries face in world markets is that rich countries now shut out many of these 
imports under a whole host of safety and sanitary regulations (sometimes imposed 
under pressure from lobbyists of import-competing farms in those countries). This 
actually increases the importance of the need for involving rich-country transnational 
companies in marketing poor-country products. These companies can deal with the 
regulatory and lobbying machinery in rich countries far better than the small 
producers of poor countries can and at the same time can provide to consumers 
credible guarantees of quality and safety. Of course, these companies will charge 
hefty fees for this marketing service (usually much larger than the total production 
cost), but the small farmers will usually be better off with them rather than without.  
Similarly, it may be very difficult, costly, and time-consuming for small producers of 
manufactures or services in developing countries to establish brand name and 
reputation in quality and timely delivery, which are absolutely crucial in marketing, 
particularly in international markets (much more than comparative costs of production 
which traditional trade theory emphasizes). This is where multinational marketing 
chains with global brand names, mediating between domestic suppliers and foreign 
buyers, can be very helpful for a long time, and paying the high marketing margin 
they charge may sometimes be worth it. At the same time coordinated attempts on the 
part of developing countries, with technical assistance from international 
organizations, to build international quality certification institutions for their products 
should be a high priority.  
There is very little empirical evidence on the precise figures of marketing margins. 
There are occasional newspaper reports, for example, that for a 44lb box of bananas 
that sells for about US$25 in US supermarkets, the producers in Ecuador get only 
US$2 or US$3. Similarly there are reports that for a shirt that sells for at least US$20 
in Gap stores in the US, the producer in Hong Kong gets less than US$1. Of course, 
much of the difference is made up of transportation, distribution and inventory costs, 
but the marketing margins are likely to be substantial. Those who are thus justifiably 
outraged by the extremely high marketing margins the monopoly multinational 
companies currently charge the poor producers should agitate more for anti-trust 
action, not anti-trade action. There should also be more energetic international 
attempts to certify codes against international restrictive business practices and to 
establish an international anti-trust investigation agency, possibly under WTO 
auspices. Even if such an agency may not have much enforcement powers, 
                                                 
8  See, for example, the recent Oxfam Report (2002).  
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internationally publicized reports of anti-trust investigations by a recognized 
international body will have some impact on rapacious monopolies. 
Trade liberalization, even when increasing the mean incomes of the poor, may 
heighten their vulnerability, particularly by increasing the variance of prices or 
income sources. Theoretically, there can be conflicting factors working here, and 
whether in a particular case variability increases or not can only be resolved 
empirically for different cases. For a brief summary of the empirical literature on this 
question, see Winters, McCulloch, and McKay (2004). For example, they cite a study 
of how trade liberalization may have helped to mitigate the post-flood food crisis in 
Bangladesh in 1998 with private imports stabilizing prices; on the other hand, they 
cite evidence from Côte d’Ivoire that the ending of domestic marketing arrangements 
with liberalization may have increased the variance of prices. There is, of course, 
general agreement on the low capacity of the poor to cope with negative price and 
income shocks. 
There is also the issue of commodity concentration of exports. More than 50 
developing countries depend on three or fewer primary commodities for more than 
half of their export. Exports of such products are often a curse as well as a blessing for 
these countries, as their prices fluctuate wildly and as the economy is too dependent 
on them. As a result of recent cases of elimination of the erstwhile inefficiently-run 
marketing boards and the dismantling of wasteful stabilization schemes, farmers in 
many African countries now receive a higher fraction9 of a more volatile (and in some 
cases, lower) world market price.10 International commodity agreements among these 
countries to control their supply in the world market have not worked very well in the 
past. For reducing their economic vulnerability there is probably not much alternative 
to attempts at diversification in production and skill-formation, and gradual 
movement up the supply chain toward activities with more value addition for the 
same commodity and arranging at an international level institutions of insurance for 
farmers in poor countries.  
With the opening of the economy just as export crops face new opportunities 
potentially lifting their producers from poverty, crops where the country may lack 
comparative advantage will lose out and push their small producers into poverty if in 
a situation of pervasive failure of credit and insurance markets, there is no vigorous 
programme of public adjustment assistance and extension services to help producers 
to reallocate their resources. The poor growers of traditional crops are often ill-
equipped to shift by themselves to the new commercial products like fruits, 
vegetables, flowers, dairy products, processed foods, etc. These products require new 
storage and transport infrastructure, large set-up costs, marketing connections, and 
new legal rules and institutional structures that can facilitate contract farming and 
agro-processing in a way that does not expose small producers to exploitation by large 
marketing chains. This is clearly not an argument against globalization but for pro-
active public programmes to help poor farmers adjust and coordinate. International 
                                                 
9  Unless the public monopsony is replaced by private marketing cartels. 
10 See, for example, Gilbert and Varangis (2003) for the case of cocoa. For a whole range of crops in 
Africa see the analysis in Townsend (1999).  
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agencies which preach the benefits of free trade have an obligation to contribute to 
such programmes with financial, organizational and technical assistance. 
What has been said in the preceding paragraphs about self-employed farmers is also 
largely valid for those who are self-employed in non-agricultural activities in the rural 
sector. Some firms adjust well to new trade opportunities, while others find it difficult 
to cope with the competition, depending on their initial asset, credit and other 
infrastructural conditions. Parker, Riopelle and Steel (1995) in their study of small 
enterprises in five African countries show that firms that adapted quickly benefited 
from import liberalization, while those ill-prepared to face competition lost out. What 
is called for is, therefore, liberalization to be accompanied by a comprehensive policy 
package for enhancing the capability of latter firms and a safety net for people who 
lose in the process.  
In rural industrialization the most successful recent case with a major role of exports 
and foreign direct investment is, of course, that of the township and village enterprises 
in China, whose phenomenal growth in the 1980s and the 1990s may have played an 
important part in the reduction of poverty in China. Exports of apparel and light 
manufactures also led to a significant reduction of poverty in Vietnam—for a 
measurement of the poverty impact on the basis of a micro-simulation model, see 
Hertel et al. (2003). Ravallion and Datt (2002) find across states in India, that the 
elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to non-farm output growth varies 
depending on initial conditions, like literacy or land distribution. 
Section 3 
Turning to poor wage earners, the literature on how international trade affects the 
absolute level of the real wage or employment of unskilled workers is extremely small 
relative to the one on wage inequality (which, though an important issue, is not 
directly relevant for my concern with absolute poverty here). Empirically it is hard to 
disentangle the effects on wages of trade reform from those flowing from 
macroeconomic policy changes or other on-going deregulatory reforms and 
technological changes. 
The traditional international trade theory suggests that the workers in a poor country 
(presumably having abundant supplies of unskilled labour) having a comparative 
advantage in products intensive in unskilled labour should benefit from trade 
liberalization. The improvement in wages and employment of garment workers in 
Bangladesh or Mauritius or Vietnam with expanding exports is an obvious example. 
The matter is, of course, complicated for some developing countries (say, Brazil or 
Mexico or Turkey) which may import labour-intensive products from even poorer 
countries (say, China or Indonesia or Bangladesh), so that trade, consistent with the 
traditional theory, may lead to lower wages in the former set of developing countries, 
for which there seems to be some evidence.11 Similarly, if a poor country has large 
                                                 
11 This was emphasized by Wood (1997). For detailed evidence from Colombia, see Goldberg and 
Pavcnik (2001).   
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supplies of non-labour factors of production (like land or mineral resources), trade 
liberalization may not benefit the labour-intensive sectors. 
On the basis of household survey data, Hertel et al. (2003) estimate that global trade 
liberalization leads in the long run (i.e., when labour and capital are mobile across 
sectors) to a decline in poverty for all strata of the population; this is largely because 
of increased demand for unskilled labour which lifts income even of some of the 
formerly self-employed who now move into the wage labour market. Edmonds and 
Pavcnik (2003) also note how Vietnam’s liberalization of rice trade in the 1990s led to 
a gainful reallocation of labour of the poor from household occupations to the wage 
labour market. 
In some cases, however, intersectoral mobility is limited for prolonged periods. If 
some factors of production are intersectorally immobile, and some goods are non-
traded, real wage of an unskilled worker in a poor country may not go up with trade 
liberalization even in an otherwise standard model of trade theory. Take a three-good 
model in a hypothetical African country: one is a non-tradable good (say, a 
subsistence food crop) that is largely grown by women who, for various social and 
economic reasons, cannot move to other sectors, another good (say, an exportable tree 
crop) produced largely by men in a capital-intensive way (maybe simply because tree 
crops lock up capital for a long period), and the third good is an importable (say, 
processed food) which is somewhat substitutable in consumption for the subsistence 
food. In this three-sector model it is not difficult to show that the real wage of women 
may go down when the importable processed food is made cheaper by trade 
liberalization (under the condition that the elasticity of substitution in consumption of 
the two foods is sufficiently high). What we have said about poor African women 
here is equally true for other people anywhere who are mobility-constrained (old 
workers and people who do not have the collateral to raise capital to start new 
ventures or move to new sectors, etc.). 
It is often suggested that globalization associated with more ‘informalization’ may 
worsen the conditions of workers. If large firms facing more foreign competition and 
pressure to reduce costs outsource activities to smaller firms or household enterprises 
in the informal sector,12 the average wage (of those formerly employed in the formal 
sector) may go down, but this need not impoverish workers in general if the poorer 
informal workers get more employment this way.  
Let us now discuss the case of the poor as consumers. Whether they gain as 
consumers from trade depends on whether they are net buyers of tradable goods—for 
example, the landless labourers in east or south India who are net buyers of rice may 
gain from imports of cheaper rice from Thailand, but may lose from higher prices of 
medicine as the Indian drug market becomes internationalized (with the laws 
changing in 2005 from recognizing only process patents to the international product 
patent system under TRIPS), or how monopolistic is the retail market structure which 
often blocks the pass-through from border prices to domestic prices—for example, in 
                                                 
12 Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) find some evidence that the increase in the size of the 
informal sector in Colombia towards the end of the 1990s is related to increased foreign 
competition.  
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Mexico after NAFTA, the cartelized tortilla sector largely maintained prices even 
with the availability of cheaper North American corn. In one of the most 
disaggregated exercises in the empirical literature, with the use of Morocco’s 
household survey of living standards and a general-equilibrium simulation of trade 
policy change, Ravallion and Lokshin (2004) show that liberalization of cereal 
imports in that country (which does not have a comparative advantage in water-
intensive cereals production) leads to a rise in rural poverty, with the losses to the net 
producers of cereals outweighing the gains to the net consumers among the poor. 
Whether developing countries are net importers or exporters of agricultural products 
varies a great deal from country to country. From FAO data sources Valdes and 
McCalla (2004) compute that of the 115 low-income and low-middle-income 
countries, 62 are net agricultural-good importing countries and 53 are net 
agricultural-good exporting countries. In general with the expected price rise from 
agricultural trade liberalization in the form of reduction of agricultural tariffs and 
subsidies in developed countries, the former set of countries is likely to lose and the 
latter to gain. So contrary to the impression one gets from advocates of agricultural 
trade liberalization, many poor countries will not gain from this liberalization.13 In 
particular, of the 46 least-developed countries (by UN classification) 30 are net 
agricultural-good importing countries,14 and it is unlikely that with liberalization 
some of the latter will transform themselves into large agriculture-exporting countries. 
Even in the case of the fewer agriculture-exporting least-developed countries, many of 
them are likely to lose the special preferential status they enjoy under the current 
regime in some developed markets; for example, many least-developed countries in 
Africa have duty- and quota-free access to the EU market so that they currently sell in 
this market at the high EU internal prices. This, of course, does not apply to the 
recently publicized case of poor countries exporting cotton, as the highest domestic 
subsidies (depressing world price) are in the US. 
Section 4 
Let us now briefly turn to the case of the poor as recipients of public services. In the 
low-income developing countries, the poor, particularly those who are in the 
preponderant informal sector, do not receive much of effective social protection from 
the state, but the public sector is usually involved in basic services like education and 
health and public works programmes. Cuts in public budgets on these basic services 
are often attributed to globalization, as the budget cuts to reduce fiscal deficits often 
come as part of a package of macroeconomic stabilization prescribed by international 
agencies like the IMF. Trade reforms can bring about a decline in customs revenue 
(which is usually a substantial source of total government revenue in low-income 
countries) due to tariff cuts, to the extent these are not compensated by the 
replacement of the pre-existing quotas by tariffs. But Pritchett and Sethi (1994) 
analyse the experience of Jamaica, Kenya, and Pakistan on their tariff reductions and 
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is in one country, Bangladesh, which is a net importer of agricultural goods.   
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found that revenues often fell substantially less than tariff rates did. Much depends on 
the nature of customs administration, the degree of complexity of the tariff structure, 
and the scope for expansion of the revenue base following trade reform. 
While there is a lot of scope for improvement in the internationally prescribed 
(occasionally ideologically blinkered) stabilization programmes to minimize their 
adverse impact on the poor, one should keep in mind that the fiscal deficits in these 
poor countries are often brought about in the first place more by domestic profligacy 
in matters of subsidies to the rich, salaries for the bloated public sector or military 
extravaganza. Faced with mounting fiscal deficits the governments often find it 
politically easier to cut the public expenditures for the voiceless poor (along with 
public investment programmes), and that is primarily due to the domestic political 
clout of the rich who are disinclined to share in the necessary fiscal austerity, and it is 
always convenient to blame an external agency for a problem that is essentially 
domestic in origin.  
The low quality and quantity of public services like education and health in poor 
countries is not just due to their relatively low share in the public budget. To a large 
extent, even the limited money allocated in the budget does not reach the poor 
because of all kinds of top-heavy administrative obstacles and bureaucratic and 
political corruption. The development literature is full of accounts of targeting failures 
in social expenditures.15 Again this is a domestic institutional failure, not largely an 
external problem. The major effort required here is to strengthen the domestic 
institutions of accountability. 
Apart from basic public services, the poor are also users of common property 
resources, the decline in which is not usually taken into account in the standard 
estimates of poverty, based as they are on either household surveys of private 
consumer expenditure or national income accounts. Environmentalists argue that trade 
liberalization damages the poor by encouraging overexploitation of the fragile 
environmental resources (forestry, fishery, surface and groundwater irrigation, 
grazing lands, etc.) on which the daily livelihoods of particularly the rural poor 
crucially depend. Here also the answers are actually complex and mere trade 
restriction is not the solution. The environmental effects of trade liberalization on the 
rural economy depend on the crop pattern and the methods of production. Take, for 
example, an African rural economy where the exportable product is a capital-intensive 
tree crop (like coffee or cocoa), the import substitute is a land-intensive crop (like 
maize), and there is a labour-intensive subsistence (non-traded) crop (like roots and 
tubers). The economy may have a comparative advantage in tree crops. In this case 
under a trade protection regime, an increase in import substitution leads to an 
expansion of cultivated land under the land-intensive crop as well as a shortening of 
the fallow period, leading to depletion of natural vegetation and biomass. Trade 
liberalization in this context, through encouraging the production of the less land-
intensive tree crop, can significantly improve the natural biomass, as has been shown 
by Lopez (2000) for Côte d’Ivoire in the latter part of the 1980s, using the data from 
the Living Standards Survey and some remote sensing data from satellite images. 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999).  
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One reason why land-intensive crops may lead to overuse of land and depletion of 
natural vegetation (or that expansion of the agricultural frontier in general leads to 
deforestation) is the lack of well-defined property rights or lack of their enforcement 
in public or communal land. In such cases private cost of expanding production is less 
than the social cost and there is overuse and degradation of environmental resources. 
If the country exports such resource-intensive products, foreign trade may make this 
misallocation worse. International trade theorists point out that trade restriction is not 
the first-best policy in this situation, correcting the property rights regime is 
(including community based regulations and coordination). But the latter involves 
large changes in the legal-regulatory or community institutional framework which 
take a long time to implement, and given the threshold effects and irreversibilities in 
environmental degradation (a forest regeneration requires a minimum stock, for 
example), one may not afford to wait. In that case some programme of (time-bound) 
trade restriction coupled with serious attempts at the overhaul of the domestic 
institutional framework may be necessary. In other cases domestic policy changes can 
be implemented much more quickly, and restricting trade is unnecessary and 
undesirable. For example, when coastal shrimp ponds in a shrimp-exporting country 
like India or Bangladesh pollute the water supply and destroy surrounding mangroves, 
domestic taxes on the basis of ‘polluter pays’ principle are imperative. In some cases 
domestic government policies are primarily responsible for environmental 
degradation. For example, administered underpricing of precious environmental 
resources (irrigation water in India, energy in Russia, timber concessions in Indonesia 
and the Philippines, etc.), prolonged by the pressure from powerful political lobbies, 
is a major cause of resource depletion. Domestic vested interests, not globalization, 
are responsible for the continuation of such socially damaging policies.  
In the case of some resource-intensive exports, it is difficult for a country by itself to 
adopt environmental regulations if its international competitors do not adopt them at 
the same time and have the ability to undercut the former in international markets. 
Here there is an obvious need for coordination in the environmental regulation 
policies of the countries concerned. Given the low elasticity of demand for many 
resource-intensive primary export commodities from developing countries in the 
world market,16 such coordinated policies, while raising prices and the terms of trade, 
need not lead to a decline in export revenue.  
A common charge against multinational companies is that they flock to developing 
country ‘pollution havens’ to take advantage of lax environmental standards. In one of 
the very few careful empirical studies on the question, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) 
examine the pattern of foreign investment in Mexico, Venezuela, Morocco and Côte 
d’Ivoire. They find no evidence that foreign investment in these countries is related to 
pollution abatement costs in rich countries. They also find that within a given 
industry, foreign plants are significantly more energy-efficient and use cleaner types 
of energy compared to their local peers.  
                                                 
16 Repetto (1995) puts together the estimates of world elasticity of demand for some of the natural 
resource-intensive export commodities of developing countries. For the eight commercial 
agricultural commodities considered by him, the absolute value of the elasticity does not exceed 
0.5. For tropical timber, it is 0.16 for nonconifer logs, 0.74 for nonconifer sawnwood, and 1.14 for 
nonconifer plywood.   
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Section 5 
In general the debates on globalization often involve a clash of counterfactuals. On 
one side, those who are against the pace of business-as-usual global trade and 
investment are making a plea for doing something about the jobs and entrepreneurial 
opportunities for the poor and for small enterprises that are being wiped out, and 
against the monopolistic practices of giant multinational companies and the 
environmental damages caused by the economic expansion. So their counterfactual is 
the world of more social justice and less dominant trading and investment companies, 
which gives some more breathing space to the poor producers and workers. On the 
other side, the counterfactual for pro-globalizers is the case when there is no (or 
limited) trade or foreign investment, a world which may be worse for the poor (as it is 
in the extreme cases of the closed economies of North Korea and Burma). The way 
out of this clash of counterfactuals is to insist that there are policies that may attempt 
to help the poor without necessarily undermining the forces of globalization. In this 
paper we have emphasized that in the medium to long run, globalization need not 
make the poor much worse off, if appropriate domestic policies and institutions are in 
place and appropriate coordination among the involved parties can be organized. If 
the institutional prerequisites can be managed, globalization opens the door for some 
new opportunities even for the poor. Of course, domestic institutional reform is not 
easy and it requires political leadership, popular participation and administrative 
capacity which are often lacking in poor countries. One can only say that if we keep 
the focus on agitating against multinational companies and international organizations 
like the WTO, attention in those countries often gets deflected from the domestic 
institutional vested interests, and the day of politically challenging them gets 
postponed. In fact in some cases opening the economy may unleash forces for such a 
challenge. 
As in the debates several decades back around ‘dependency’ theories in development 
sociology, there is often a tendency to attribute much of the problems of 
underdevelopment to the inexorable forces of the international economic and political 
order, ignoring the sway of the domestic vested interests. In many countries, rural 
poverty alleviation in the form of expansion of credit, marketing and extension 
facilities, or land reform, or public works programmes for the unemployed, or 
provision of education, vocational training, and health need not be blocked by the 
forces of globalization. This, of course, requires a restructuring of existing budget 
priorities and a better and more accountable political and administrative framework, 
but the obstacles to these are often largely domestic (particularly in countries where 
there are some coherent governance structures in place). In other words, for these 
countries, globalization is often not the main cause of their problems, contrary to the 
claim of critics of globalization; just as globalization is often not the main solution of 
these problems, contrary to the claim of some over-enthusiastic free traders. 
All this, of course, does not absolve the responsibility of international organizations 
and entities in helping the poor of the world, by working toward a reduction of rich-
country protection on goods produced by the poor, by energetic anti-trust action to 
challenge the monopoly power of international (producing and trading) companies 
based in rich countries, by facilitating international partnerships in research and 
development of products (for example, drugs, vaccines, crops) suitable for the poor, 
and by organizing more substantial (and more effectively governed) financial and  
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technology transfers and international adjustment assistance for displaced workers, 
and help in (legal and technical) capacity-building for poor countries in international 
negotiations and quality certification organizations. Globalization should not be 
allowed to be used, either by its critics or by its proponents, as an excuse for inaction 
on the domestic as well as the international front when the matter involved is that of 
relieving the crushing poverty in the life of billions of people in the world. 
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